Approved For Release 20 10 16: SEOR \$ 0975A004900270001-8

3 February 1960

Copy No. C

25X

DATE 6 JUN 1980 MEVIEWERS

25X1

# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



TOP SECRET

M

### LATE ITEM

## \*Non-radiating Satellite Detected

The US space radar surveillance facilities have detected a non-radiating (dark) satellite which is circling the earth in a near polar orbit, i.e., approximately 80° inclination. Five positive radar contacts have been made between 31 January and 3 February 1960. The period of the satellite orbit is about 104.5 minutes. It appears fairly certain that this object is not one of the previously identified satellites either Soviet or US. Preliminary analysis does not allow identification of time or place of launching, but the satellite is almost certainly of Soviet origin.

25X1

25X1


3 Feb 60

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page O

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

3 February 1960



25X1

### DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Warsaw Pact Meeting: The principal purpose of the meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign and defense ministers in Moscow on 4 February may be to endorse the USSR's recent decision on unilateral force reduction, to consider plans for reductions of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and possibly to announce cuts in European satellite forces. The conference probably will also issue a warning that the bloc will be compelled to take military countermeasures in Eastern Europe to offset Bonn's alleged policy of nuclear rearmament. East German party chief Ulbricht threatened in his letter of 23 January to Adenauer that unless West Germany "discontinues its atomic armament within a short time," East Germany will be forced "to request its allies to place rocket weapons at its disposal."

[Page 1]

### II. ASIA-AFRICA

i

25X1

25X1

# III. THE WEST

25X1	10	poned from March until May, if—as now appears possible—there is still no agreement by 7 February on the size of the sovereign British base areas. Britain claims it cannot further reduce the size of its bases and is putting heavy pressure on all parties to agree to its terms. Foreign Secretary Lloyd might call a new conference to reopen the whole question of the island's future status, thus abrogating the February 1959 Cyprus Agreements.	25X1 25X1
	40	Cuba: Oswaldo Dorticos, figurehead president of the Castro regime, delivered his strongest anti-American speech on 30 January. This contrasts with his assurances earlier last week that the Cuban Government desires improved relations with the United States. Meanwhile, the public is becoming increasingly aroused at the number and boldness of unidentified aircraft flying over Cuba and setting fire to sizable quantities of sugar cane. The Cuban public is convinced that the aircraft come from the US, and public resentment could quickly erupt into serious anti-US demonstrations.	25X1
	OK	*India: The coalition of anti-Communist parties in Kerala State has scored a decisive victory over the Communists. Final results will not be announced until late on 3 February, but returns from a majority of the constituencies indicate the coalition is winning around 75 percent of the state assembly seats. The Congress party may gain enough seats to try to form a government independently, although a coalition with the Praja Socialist party is a more likely prospect. These two groups, long bitter rivals, probably will be unable to maintain the same degree of cooperation while in power as they have in opposition. Kerala's chronic economic problems also make it unlikely that the new government can improve on the performance of previous regimes without massive financial aid from the national government.  DAILY BRIEF  ii	- 25X

Approved For Release 2002/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004900270001-8

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Moscow Meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign And Defense Ministers

The meeting of the Warsaw Pact "Political Consultative Committee" in Moscow on 4 February probably will be used as a forum to demonstrate bloc solidarity and support for Soviet proposals on disarmament, Berlin, and a German peace treaty in the pre-summit period. Bloc leaders probably will also use this opportunity to underline their readiness to take appropriate military countermeasures in Eastern Europe to offset Bonn's alleged policy of nuclear rearmament.

The pact ministers can be expected to endorse the USSR's recent decision to reduce its armed forces by one third and to consider plans for what Khrushchev has termed "proportionate" reductions in Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. The conference may also announce cuts in European satellite forces.

Bloc leaders used a pact meeting in May 1958 to announce the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Rumania and one Soviet division from Hungary, as well as troop reductions by the satellites: 55,000 for Rumania, 23,000 for Bulgaria, 20,000 for Poland, 20,000 for Czechoslovakia, and 1,000 for Albania. The 1958 session of the "Political Consultative Committee" called on the West to follow suit and thus "prove by deeds" its professed desire for peace.

The meeting on 4 February may also renew such earlier proposals as a NATO - Warsaw Pact nonaggression pact. Such "peaceful moves" probably will be accompanied by a strong warning of countermeasures if West Germany pursues its alleged policy of nuclear rearmament and refuses to join East Germany in an arms limitation agreement for Germany. A warning along these lines was foreshadowed in East German party chief Ulbricht's letter of 23 January to Chancellor Adenauer, which stated that unless Bonn discontinues atomic armaments "within a short

4.	
	25X1
	٠.

Page 1

time," East Germany will be forced to "request its allies to place rocket weapons at its disposal."

The last explicit warning that NATO policy might oblige the Warsaw Pact to station missiles in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia was made by Khrushchev in his speech to the "Political Consultative Committee" session in May 1958.

Peiping sent high-ranking officials to attend previous meetings of the "Political Consultative Committee" as observers. In contrast to the 4 February meeting, which will be an official Warsaw Pact conference, the meeting in April 1959 was billed as a "conference of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact organization and the Chinese People's Republic," which enabled Peiping to participate fully in the proceedings.

0EV1		

25X1

3 Feb 60

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 2

25X1

III Approved For Release 2002/\$\psi\$5/16 : CIA-R\$\propto\$P79T00975A004900270001-8 25X1 Cyprus Disagreement Persists Cypriot independence will have to be postponed from March until May if -- as now appears possible -- agreement is not reached by 7 February on the size of the sovereign British base areas. Other scheduled parliamentary business will prevent British consideration of the necessary legislation for two additional months unless it is presented shortly. Britain is therefore exerting heavy pressure to obtain agreement on its terms, stating that defense requirements preclude any further reduction of the base areas. During the 16-19 January conference in London, Secretary Lloyd even threatened to cancel the Zurich-London agreements of February 1959. 25X1 25X1 Basic agreement has been reached on facilities to be provided outside the base enclaves. Although the British are willing to delegate--but not transfer--most of the civil administration to the Cypriots, Archbishop Makarios continues to insist on smaller bases and full transfer of civil authority. London is offering \$22,400,000 in economic aid over the next five years as an inducement but opposes the Cypriot demand for "rent" for the bases.7 Makarios, aware that the future of his conservative political party on Cyprus is at stake in the negotiations, has taken a firm stand which has been approved by all segments of the press in Nicosia. Any sign of weakness in the face of British pressure would expose him to criticism from both Communists and Greek nationalists on the island, which could be reflected in increased support for extremist candidates in the Cypriot parliamentary elections. Frustration and anger in Cyprus over failure to secure concessions on the base issue at this time could lead to future difficulties between Britain and a potentially unfriendly Cypriot government. 25X1 25X1 Approved Release P/05 C RID 79T00-5A004900270001-8 TOP SECRET